Divorce and divorcees are referred to about a dozen times in the Old Testament. Since Jesus' teaching about divorce occurred within the context of Jewish presuppositions about the matter, it is vital that we get a clear view of what these dozen passages in the Old Testament have to say about it, given that they form the base or mould from which the Jewish presuppositions derived.
At first sight there seems to be a certain level of ambiguity about how divorce and divorcees were viewed in ancient Israel. On the one hand, divorce was recognized as a fact of life and mentioned more frequently than many normal aspect of life. Divorced women were taken seriously as responsible beings; Num 30:9, for example, makes any vow or obligation contracted by a divorcee binding. At the same time priests were prohibited from marrying divorcees (Lev 21:7, 14; Eze 44:22), suggesting that being a divorcee was less than the best that God intended and incompatible with ritual propriety. On the other hand, if a priest's daughter was divorced but had no children, she may return to her father's house and "eat of her father's food" which "no unauthorized person may eat" (Lev 22:13).
Incidental references to divorce make it clear that a divorce was made effective by the husband writing the wife a "certificate of divorce" (sepher keritut, "a letter of cutting"; see, e.g., Isa 50:1; Jer 3:8; Deut 24:1, 3; also Matt 5:31; 19:7//Mk 10:4). We also know that under two specific circumstances divorce is not permitted. The first is spelled out in Deut 22:13-19, in which a man marries a virgin woman, but after sleeping with her, slanders her by charging that she was not a virgin, and his accusation was found to be false. In such cases, the man would be fined "one hundred shekels of silver" and "he cannot divorce her as long as he lives." The second is described in Deut 22:28-29, in which "a man happens to meet a virgin who is not pledged to be married and rapes her and they are discovered, he shall pay the girl's father fifty shekels of silver. He must marry the girl, for he has violated her. He shall not be permitted to divorce her as long as he lives."
In all of the passages we have referred to so far, two other conclusions may be drawn. First, it is also clear that remarriage after divorce was assumed to be permitted. Why else would an instruction to the priests, for example, specifically prohibit them from marrying divorced women if re-marriage after divorce was prohibited? Second, in the case where a spouse has committed adultery divorce was permitted. This seems to be assumed in Isaiah's and Jeremiah's reference to Yahweh's divorce of Israel (Isa 50:1 and Jer 3:8). It is also reflected in Matthew's report that Joseph, not wishing to make a public example of Mary after he discovered she was pregnant with Jesus, sought to divorce her quietly (Matt 1:19). Whether divorce was also mandatory in such cases, however, cannot be answered on the basis of the evidence available.
Beyond these facts we know almost next to nothing else about divorce from the instructional literature of the OT. On the question to which we want answers most—under what circumstances is divorce permitted?—the OT is silent, for there is no specific regulation concerning divorce. Some might object to this statement by pointing to Deut 24:1-4. To this passage we now turn our attention.
Deut 24:1-4 has served for centuries as the text to turn for developing the grounds and rules for divorce in the synagogue.
Rabbinic interpretations of this passage assume that divorce is permissible and focus on the grounds upon which it is permitted by asking what is meant by "something indecent." On this, there are two classical schools of thought. The school of Shammai—the more conservative—limits the grounds to adultery, while the school of Hillel is the more permissive, interpreting "something indecent" as covering anything that displeases the husband, including something as inconsequential as a burnt dinner or the simple fact that "he dislikes her."
Protestant churches have tended to follow this line of assumption that divorce is permitted under certain circumstances (though, often, limiting it to adultery), and many find the basis of such an assumption in the expression "then let him" found in the first verse of the KJV:1
When a man hath taken a wife, and married her, and it come to pass that she find no favour in his eyes, because he hath found some uncleanness in her: then let him write her a bill of divorcement, and give it in her hand, and send her out of his house.
Most modern translations, however, recognize the inaccuracy of the KJV and more accurately reflect the logic of the Hebrew text, in which the four verses that make up this instruction constitute a single sentence. Vv1-3 sets out, by means of a series of "if's," the two sets of conditions under which a man is forbidden to remarry his divorced wife (v4a), that may be summarized like this:
Condition 1: A man marries his wife, divorces her, she marries another man, and her second husband then divorces her and sends her away.
Condition 2: A man marries his wife, divorces her, she marries another man and her second husband dies.
When either of these situations occurs, remarriage is forbidden. The passage, in other words provides no prescription about when divorce is permitted; it simply assumes divorce and remarriage after divorce as a fact of ancient Iraelite life, and prohibits remarriage under the two situations mentioned. The passage is, therefore, an instruction regarding remarriage, not divorce. Nonetheless, the fact that an instruction was needed to ban remarriage in such a specific circumstance suggests that divorce and remarriage was permissible under some circumstances though what these may be are not mentioned in any of the Pentateuchal instructions. The fact that priests were also forbidden to marry divorcees (Lev 21:7 & 14; Eze 44:22) further strengthens such a suggestion.
Given such a situation it is not surprising that commentators, both Jewish and Christian, have milked this passage as much as they can for some clues regarding permissible basis for divorce, some of which are quite ingenious.2 These studies tended to focus on the meaning of "something indecent" ('erwat dabar) in the opening verse or on the differences in the nature of the two divorces (the first one legitimate because it was "because of something indecent" and the second illegitimate because it was subjective—he simply "dislikes her"). The fact, however, that it is difficult, if not impossible, to be certain if the reasons attributed to either of the two husbands for divorcing the woman are significant or mere incidental parts of the general case-description means that whatever conclusions may be drawn stand on shaky grounds.
Others have attempted to clarify the meaning of "defiled" (huttamma), as well as how such a remarriage or the woman might become "detestable (to'eba) in the eyes of the Lord" (v4) to see if these shed any clarity on the matter.3 These proposals, however, remain informed speculations at best, and none has garnered wide acceptance. Perhaps the barrier to understanding is cultural. Comments by Westerners on this passage are characterized by a mindset that perceives such remarriages as uncommon and, therefore, a non-issue. J. G. Millar's demurrage that "it is difficult to imagine the circumstances in which this law would be useful, and it surely cannot have been a regular occurrence"4 makes explicit what, probably, most Westerners believe in silence. This, perhaps, explains why their studies tend to pay more attention trawling the passage for the procedure and permissibility of divorce (that forms the background to this prohibition) rather than the prohibited remarriage that is the main object of the instruction. That a specific instruction had to be issued regarding this particular kind of remarriage suggests that the matter, contra Millar, was an issue for ancient Israel. It is interesting that for our Muslim neighbours, a man is not allowed to remarry his wife whom he had divorced unless she had, in the interim, been remarried to another man and divorced from him.5 This custom is precisely the kind of practice proscribed here. Not inconceivably, this custom could have had its roots deep in the cultures of ancient Israel's neighbours, and that this kind of remarriage may have been more widespread and their consequences more serious than we imagine. If this were the case, it helps also to explain why the prohibition is capped by the injunction not to "bring sin upon the land," for "detestable thing" (to'eba) is the typical noun used to describe the practices of the nations against which Israel is warned to avoid in Deuteronomy (see, e.g., 7:25-26; 12:31; 13:14; 17:4; 18:9, 12; 20:18; 23:18; 32:16.).
Like the Pentateuch, the subject of divorce is not given a great deal of attention in the prophetic literature in the OT, the subject being mentioned less than half a dozen times: Isa 50:1f., Jer 3:1ff., Eze 44:22 and Mal:13ff. Ezekiel is a prescription of what priests were not allowed to do, and simply reaffirm Lev 21:7 & 14 that we have touched on above. Isa 50:1f & Jer 3:1ff. provide nothing new about when divorce may be permitted; both passages simply use divorce only as a metaphor of Israel's faithfulness, or more precisely, of Israel's lack of it. They assume Israel to be familiar with Deut 24:1-4, and on that assumption, they simply make the point that Israel's spiritual adultery had become so intolerable as to force Yahweh into the impossible situation of having to separate from and divorce her, and if the instruction was to apply, then there could be no possibility of Yahweh receiving her back into His arms. Both make the point, however, that divorce hacks hard against divine will, a point made categorically in Malachi's forceful, "I hate divorce," that divorce is a breaking of faith.
With this overview of what the Old Testament says about divorce, we need now to look at what the Lord of the new covenant has to say.
Low Chai Hok
©Alberith, 2014